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Abstract: The starting point for this paper is twofold. On the one hand, the authors have recently 
been involved in a study on European integration and border conflict transformation, which 
established conditions under which integration and association can have a desecuritising effect on 
border conflicts. One core condition was an image of the EU as a positive force in world politics. 
On the other hand, both authors have been involved in the debate on normative power Europe and 
have argued that this concept is better seen as a discursive self-construction imbuing the 
integration project with new force and establishing an EU identity against Others, rather than an 
objective analytical concept. In this paper, we explore the degree to which this self-construction 
of the EU is shared by others in international society, and in particular in conflict areas. Our basic 
hypothesis is that the EU's chances to act as a mediator, or to transform conflicts through 
association agreements and other forms of partnerships, largely depends on this acceptance of the 
notion of normative power Europe. The paper draws upon the cases of Cyprus and 
Israel/Palestine as examples. Its aim is to develop a theoretical framework with which the basic 
hypothesis can be studied, to discuss initial examples, and to draw out the political and normative 
consequences from the relationship between normative power Europe and conflict 
transformation, especially in light of our earlier criticism of the EU's self-construction. 
 
Work in progress – incomplete references. Comments welcome. 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction: Normative Power and Conflict Transformation 
 
That the EU is a novel type of actor in international politics is a widely accepted 
statement, although it is much more contested what exactly the features of this new actor 
are. Since Ian Manner’s seminal article on this subject, the notion that the EU is a 
normative power has come to the centre of this debate (Manners 2002; see also Diez and 
Manners 2007). Manners sees the difference between the power of the EU and 
traditional, military forms of power in that the EU does not rely on military force or 
capabilities to achieve its aims, that its aims are linked to universal goods rather than 
being in the narrowly defined self-interest of the EU, and that it realises these goods by 
defining what should be accepted as “normal”. Manners does not exclude the possibility 
that military power can at times reinforce normative power, but his central argument is 
that the EU as a normative power does not rely on military power to set the agenda and 
the standards of international politics. In contrast to earlier conceptualisations of its 
civilian power, it is not even economic means that are at the core of EU power. Instead, 
power becomes an effect of norm leadership and persuasion. 
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criticism. We have ourselves been involved in this debate (Diez 2005; Pace 2007a), 
where we have argued that “normative power Europe” is a discursive construction rather 
than an objective fact, and that the “power of normative power Europe” rests in the 
identity it provides for the EU and the changes it imposes on others, partly through its 
hegemonic status. Following our Foucauldian understanding of power, however, we 
argued that such a power is not necessarily a bad thing. Power, as Foucault reminds us, is 
first and foremost a productive force (Foucault 1981; 73). Whether the reality that is 
enabled by this power is a good or a bad one depends on the normative stance of the 
evaluator. In this paper, we explore the possibility that the self-construction of the EU as 
a normative power has positive effects on its potential influence to bring about positive 
conflict transformation, while at the same time it remains problematic in the Othering that 
it performs.  
 
The idea that European integration and the EU itself are a positive force to resolve and 
transcend conflict is an old one, and we have explored this further in the context of 
another project (see Diez et al. 2006 and forthcoming). One of the findings of this project 
was that EU actors see themselves and the EU as a whole as a “force for good” in conflict 
situations, and indeed in world politics generally speaking (Pace forthcoming). This 
tallies with our earlier argument that “normative power Europe” is first and foremost a 
discourse in which EU actors themselves construct themselves as “model citizens”.  
 
Does this self-construction of EU actors enable them to play a positive role in conflict 
transformation, or is it rather a hindrance? If it does play a positive role, should one on 
this basis not happily partake in this discourse, as Manners (2006b) suggests in his 
defence? These are the questions that we will address in this paper. We begin by setting 
out the core concepts that we use and the theoretical debates we draw upon (section 2). In 
section 3, we provide evidence of EU actors portraying themselves as a ‘force for good’ 
in conflict situations and link this to the “normative power Europe” debate. We then 
proceed to assess the impact of this self-portrayal in concrete conflict situations, where 
we draw primarily on our work on Cyprus and the Middle East (section 4). Finally, we 
argue that while there are instances where the “normative power Europe” discourse does 
allow EU actors to have a positive influence in conflict situations, this should not lead us 
to uncritically accept this self-representation. Instead, as critical analysts, we must always 
point to the hegemonic constructions that come with normative power, even if it appears 
to be a force for good. 
 
2.  A Theoretical Framework 
 
Third party interventions in conflicts are the subject of extensive studies in conflict 
research, which has produced a number of arguments about the conditions for success of 
mediation in particular. Among these are both factors that characterise the conflict or the 
conflict parties and factors that relate to the mediator. Zartman (1989), for instance, has 
argued that resolution attempts are most likely to be successful if a conflict is “ripe” in 
that it has reached a “hurting” stalemate that the parties cannot maintain without huge 
cost, and where neither party sees itself as likely to achieve victory. As far as the 
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respected and impartial, although not necessarily in a combination of all of these qualities 
(Smith 1994; Siniver 2006: 809). Before exploring these further in relation to “normative 
power”, let us first address several other aspects of this literature that are of relevance to 
our argument. 
 
Firstly, the literature is at odds about when exactly a mediation attempt can be counted as 
successful. Some regard the conclusion of a peace agreement as sufficient; others focus 
on broader changes of attitude (Siniver 2006: 808). We side with the latter. While this 
makes the measurement of success more difficult, the mere signing of an agreement is 
not sufficient to count as a mediation success unless this agreement turns out to be a 
milestone towards lasting peace. To achieve lasting peace, however, the incompatibilities 
at the heart of a conflict need to be transformed, which requires broader societal changes 
in terms of the definition of identities and interests. We also, however, maintain that 
success does not have to be characterised by the disappearance of conflict. Rather, 
conflict will remain in any society – the crucial question is how conflict is dealt with, and 
how other conflict parties are seen within society. We therefore speak of conflict 
transformation as the ultimate aim of third party intervention, which indicates that if such 
intervention is successful, conflict will persist, but the way actors see themselves and 
relate to each other will have been transformed to such an extent that they will not resort 
to violent means, and ideally will change their identity so that conflict is fundamentally 
altered (see Diez et al. 2006: 565-6). The “measure” that we apply to assess 
transformation is the degree to which actors make their claims in the form of securitising 
moves, i.e. the extent to which they invoke the other party or parties as an existential 
threat to legitimise their actions, and ultimately violence (Diez et al. 2006: 566-7; on 
securitisation, see Buzan et al. 1998: 21-4; Wæver 1995 as well as Diez and Huysmans 
2007).  
 
The literature secondly focuses on mediation through a particular actor. We use the 
broader concept of intervention here, by which we do not mean military intervention but 
any involvement of a third party in a conflict, which can include support for Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), conflict resolution workshops, and other such 
activities aimed at conflict transformation but not necessarily fitting the category of 
“mediation”. Furthermore, while the literature usually distinguishes between mediating 
actors and institutional contexts, the EU plays a role both as a classical third party actor 
and as an institutional context insofar as it has been using integration and association as 
means to achieve conflict transformation (see Diez et al. 2006; Higashino 2004). The 
effect of the institutional context that the EU provides on conflicts is often described as a 
form of Europeanisation (Coppetiers et al. 2004).  
 
It is intriguing in this context that Manners developed his concept of normative power 
explicitly in contrast to the question of whether the EU is an actor or not (add reference). 
Normative power does not presuppose an actor that consciously exerts this power; it can 
also emanate from an institutional structure (in the EU context, the acquis 
communautaire), or from a broad discourse associated with the EU. However, there is an 
ambiguity in the way that Manners uses the concept of power. On the one hand, power, 
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property of the entity that is associated with the more powerful position in the 
relationship. To that extent, the EU both exerts normative power and is a normative 
power.  
 
As indicated in the introduction, most of the literature has now engaged in a dispute about 
whether the characterisation of the EU as a normative power in this sense is accurate. 
Leaving aside whether this is a question that can be settled on the basis of empirical 
observation (for a discussion, see Diez 2005: 625-6), we want to argue that the far more 
interesting question in our context is to what extent the EU is constructed as a normative 
power, or to what extent the EU is seen as setting standards and leading by example 
rather than using military or other force in order to influence other actors. This 
construction takes place both outside the EU as well as within the EU, where there is a 
widespread self-representation as a “force for good”, especially in the Commission and 
the Parliament, but also in the Council, as we will show in the next section (see also Pace 
2007a and forthcoming). 
 
On this basis, the question becomes whether this construction of the EU as a normative 
power makes it more likely that the EU is successful when intervening in conflicts in the 
sense of being able to contribute to conflict transformation with a decreasing presence of 
securitising moves, where intervention is broadly defined to include mediation efforts as 
well as less formal engagements with conflict parties. The construction of the EU as a 
normative power can be related to the EU as an actor or to the EU as an institutional 
presence in international politics. Normative power in this sense becomes part of the 
reputation that is seen as one core factor influencing the success of third party 
interventions.  
 
We can now consider the different possibilities for the impact of the construction of the 
EU as a normative power on conflict transformation: 
 
(1) The construction is not shared by conflict parties, in which case we would expect 
no or a negative effect if the EU’s role in international politics is 
ridiculed/challenged. 
(2) The construction is shared by conflict parties but the norms espoused by the EU 
are not, in which case we would also expect no or a negative effect if the EU’s 
role in international politics is ridiculed/challenged. 
(3) The construction is shared by conflict parties, in which case we would expect that 
they are inclined to accept the EU’s role in the conflict, and would be more likely 
to follow EU advice or take the integration experience as an example.  
(4) The construction is shared only by some conflict parties, in which case we would 
expect at least a positive influence over the behaviour of this party. 
(5) The construction is shared at least by some conflict parties, but at least one 
conflict party uses EU norms to strengthen its own position, with the consequence 
of reinforcing rather than transforming conflict. 
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aspects of the EU reputation that make the normative power reference less 
effective.  
 
In the remainder of this paper, we will first establish the self-representation of EU actors 
as a normative power, and then provide some illustrations for how our framework works 
out empirically. We need to stress that we do not offer a comprehensive study that would 
sufficiently test these hypotheses, which would require a larger study than we can pursue 
here, and which would at this stage need further reflections on operationalisation.  
 
3.  The EU’s self-representation as a “force for good”
i 
 
It is our contention here that EU actors project an image of the EU as a facilitator in the 
transformation of border conflicts through projections of its ‘force for good’. The power 
of EU actors’ self-description of the EU as a ‘force for good’ is, in turn, based on an 
assumption that through international socialization – a process driven by the logics of 
appropriateness and arguing – conflict parties can be induced to accept the internalization 
of international norms. In this way, conflict parties are led to adopt the constitutive rules 
of the EU. In order to understand more fully the extent to which this self-representation 
occurs, we need to unpack the EU’s composition in terms of its key actors: the Council, 
the Commission and the European Parliament as well as the instruments at hand for these 
actors to construct an image of the EU as a force for good. 
 
When EU instruments for mediating in conflict situations are restricted to association and 
therefore stop short of an offer for full EU membership (as in the case of Israel and 
Palestine), EU actors resort to emphasizing to conflict parties the importance of 
implementing association and cooperation agreements signed by the latter with the EU as 
these processes bring conflict parties closer to the EU’s image as a ‘force for good’. The 
EU’s active role in the transformation of border conflicts is thus constructed through 
providing association as a way forward for conflict parties to emulate the cooperation 
model on which the EU is founded. Through association, EU actors thereby endeavour to 
create a discursive framework that generates similar dynamics as integration, but falls 
short of sharing the EU institutions and involvement in decision making. This discursive 
framework however can potentially turn the projection of the EU as a ‘force for good’ 
into a self-fulfilling prophecy, allowing conflict parties to claim what they have been 
promised (as in the case of Cyprus’ EU membership in the case of integration) or to take 
the opportunities offered through association to negotiate better terms for their relation 
with the EU. Through the acquis communautaire (membership), as well as the acquis of 
association (through the Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for 
Mediterranean partners) conflict parties are encouraged to either join the ‘club’ or to 
participate as close outsiders through association. These mechanisms enable EU actors to 
further their ideals of the EU as a ‘force for good’.  
 
Thus, the ‘‘force for good’’ discursive framework offers political leaders in conflict cases 
opportunities to legitimise domestic policies aimed at diminishing conflicts, from which 
the constructive impact of re-defining political identities may follow. Moreover, EU 
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civil society organisations and NGOs to use rhetorical and symbolic tools, including 
shaming tactics, to get their political leaders to comply with the values, norms and ideals 
that EU actors advance (as for instance the Cyprus case illustrates). Through the two case 
studies we drawn upon here, we aim to investigate the potential for the sharing of these 
ideals through their adoption by conflict parties. But before we do that, a look at the key 
EU actors constructing the EU as a force for good is called for. 
 
Within the Council, the Special Representative (SR) acts as a facilitator, a consensus 
builder and a focal reference point between the EU and parties to a conflict through 
almost permanent presence on the ground. In the Middle East case, the EUSR provides 
active support to actions and initiatives leading to a final settlement of the conflict and 
contributes to the implementation of international agreements reached between the parties 
and engages with them in the event of non-compliance with these agreements. He/she 
also reports on possibilities for EU engagement and on the best way of pursuing EU 
initiatives and ongoing Middle East Peace Process (MEPP)-related EU efforts. The SR is 
thereby an example of a specific EU actor working to reproduce what the EU stands for 
in its role as an external actor in border conflict situations. As one interviewee put it: 
 
Does the EU have a different approach in conflicts? The Solana 2003 security 
strategy report was the first time the EU presented its view. According to this 
strategy, we do not need an invitation to be involved. Solving the Middle East 
(ME) conflict is vital to our interests. Europe is a political concept. As 
regards the EU’s various instruments … CFSP seized to be just about 
working groups when the first Special Representative was appointed. The 
Venice Declaration in the 1980s was the first CFSP act. The ME is a 
laboratory for CFSP. The EU is present in the ME. The efficiency of our 
instruments can be improved of course … but the EU is there as a political 
actor. The invention of the Quartet came from here (Council) … the 
appointment of a Prime Minister in the PA to circumvent US/Israeli policy 
was invented here  …The Road Map was invented here …We have been 
providing the impetus … to circumvent the views of the EU being not a 
player but a banker … Barcelona (the EMP) is the first real step towards 
reconciliation in the region … we provided a forum for Arabs and Israelis … 
we believe that if the conflict is not solved we cannot solve other regional 
problems … the ME provides fertile ground for the Council, with the 
Commission and the EP, to have a role. We share communication on a daily 
basis. The ME is fertile ground for common EU institutional endeavours. 
Moratinos (former EUSR) was the path finder. Overall our efforts are 
positive.
ii
 
Moreover, each EU member state also has the opportunity to leave its own imprint on EU 
policy towards border conflicts when it holds the Presidency. The way border conflict 
issues are dealt with in the EU depend on the particular Member State Presidency’s 
priorities – which may in turn shift (albeit slightly) the priorities of the Council for those 
six months.
iii
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Furthermore, in cases of conflict within the Mediterranean, the Council and High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy are in a strategic position to 
constructing the EU’s role as a ‘force for good’ through the Common Strategy on the 
Mediterranean acquis (Attiná 2001: 282). This contrasts with the institutional structure 
designed in Barcelona in November 1995 (when the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or 
EMP was launched) and other official documents of the EMP through which the 
Commission was given a stronger strategic role in producing and reproducing the 
narrative of the EU as a ‘force for good’. As the guardian of the integration and 
association processes, the Commission emerges as endorsing the discourse of the EU as a 
‘force for good’ more forcefully than perhaps any other EU actor in the context of border 
conflicts. 
 
The Commission’s endorsement of the discourse about the EU as a ‘force for good’ is 
further reinforced through the presence of over 120 of its delegations and offices around 
the world which act as its mouthpiece in cases of conflict on the ground: 
 
On the ground we are supported by Commission delegations. Our strength in 
all situations is where we manage to reduce the intensity of conflicts through 
indirect inducements - not through areas directly related to conflict. Modesty 
is important here: we can achieve much more especially in cases of long 
standing conflicts .. We don’t (at the Commission) have the competence to 
aim for direct issues, maybe through Solana’s Security Strategy, in political 
form, we may in the future … 
iv
 
The force for good self-representation is not so obvious when we look at the European 
Parliament. In fact, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) do not easily buy into 
the discourse of the EU as a ‘force for good’.  For instance, in a report on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, MEPs emphasise that this policy - which is aimed at avoiding the 
emergence of new, dividing borders after the EU’s enlargement of May 2004 - should not 
be an instrument of ‘settling for the status quo but of committing the European Union to 
support the aspirations of the peoples of our neighbouring countries to full political 
freedom, with democracy and justice …’ including the stricter use of political 
conditionality (European Parliament 2005). This does not, however, mean that MEPs do 
not play a role in producing a self-understanding of the EU as a ‘force for good’ - witness 
the reference to political freedom etc in the same quotation. 
 
As can be concluded from this section, the workings, productions and reproductions of 
the EU as a ‘force for good’ narrative are more apparent within the Commission but also 
in the Council and Parliament. Having looked at how this construction takes place within 
the EU, we now move to examine how it plays out ‘outside’ the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
  74.  The Impact of the EU’s self-representation on conflict transformation 
 
 
4.1.  The case of Cyprus 
 
In the case of Cyprus, the construction of the EU as a normative power has played a 
predominant role in the influence the EU has had on the conflict in the island, although 
not always a positive one. A core justification for starting membership negotiations with 
Cyprus was that these would have a “catalytic effect” on the conflict (see Diez 2002a), 
eventually leading to conflict transformation and the unification of the island. Partly, this 
catalytic effect was to come about because membership was seen to be in the interest of 
ordinary Turkish Cypriots and would force Turkey to change its policy if it did not want 
to jeopardise its own membership prospects. However, there was also the expectation that 
membership would bring with it the hope for a redefinition of identities on the island, as 
well as the respect of fundamental rights of all Cypriots, whether Greek- or Turkish-
Cypriot, so that the atrocities of previous decades could not be repeated (Tocci 2005; 
Diez 2002b). It is in this latter sense that the EU was supposed to be important as a 
normative power. 
 
This view was initially advocated by the Greek Cypriots, but soon shared by many in the 
EU institutions. That Cyprus was accepted as a membership candidate in 1994, despite 
earlier hesitations by the Commission who had initially insisted on a resolution to the 
conflict, is often put down to a package deal with Greece, which also involved the end of 
Greece vetoing the customs union with Turkey. However, there is also a normative power 
aspect to the story. A core part of the normative power construction is the observance of 
international law – the EU as a “good international citizen”. Until recently, however, the 
international jurisdiction from Security Council resolutions to European Court of Human 
Rights rulings was firmly and unequivocally on the side of the Greek Cypriots, and gave 
all, or at least most of the blame for the conflict and the partition of the island to Turkey. 
Under these circumstances, the argument that the Greek Cypriots should not be penalised 
for Turkey’s violation of international law became a forceful one that was hard to counter 
by those who would have preferred to stick to the condition of resolution before 
membership. This makes clear that the self-representation of the EU as a normative 
power is not only enabling, but also restricting the EU in its engagement with conflict 
parties, and indeed more widely, as similar effects have been shown in relation to EU 
enlargement in a broader sense (Fierke and Wiener 2001; Schimmelfennig 2001). 
 
Indeed, this aspect of the normative power construction has made the EU problematic as 
an independent third party from the start. In addition, the fact that Greece has already 
been a member state when Cyprus applied for membership and the British colonial 
history of the island also contributed to the EU’s problematic involvement in the conflict. 
This is one of the reasons why it has never attempted to be a mediator in the classic sense 
of the term and left this task explicitly to the United Nations (see Richmond 2002). Even 
when, in line with the normative power construction, the EU provided funds for bi-
communal projects such as the Nicosia Master Plan, it did so through the United Nations 
Development Programme rather than directly, until Cyprus became part of the EU.  
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These circumstances also led the Turkish Cypriot leadership under Rauf Denktash to 
reject the EU membership bid as “enosis [unification with Greece] through the back 
door”. Denktash did not see the EU as a “force for good”, at least not in the Cyprus 
context. Many Greek Cypriots however unashamedly saw the prospect of EU 
membership as a tactic to strengthen their political position in the conflict, which had 
reached a “comfortable” rather than a “hurting” stalemate. From the start, therefore, 
hypothesis (5) is applicable to Cyprus, and we would have expected the reinforcement of 
the conflict rather than decreasing securitisation.  
 
On an official level, this expectation held initially, and there were threats Ref? of fully 
integrating northern Cyprus into Turkey if the south became part of the EU. Yet one of 
the mistakes in much of the literature on Cyprus was to underestimate the dissatisfaction 
among Turkish Cypriots with their leadership. While the mass demonstrations in 2001 
were sparked by a banking crisis and anger about economic measures imposed by 
Turkey, the EU became a central reference point in them to articulate claims against the 
Denktash regime in the attempt to construct a ‘non-exclusive Turkish Cypriot identity 
within the EU’ (Lacher and Kaymak 2005: 159)  In that sense, EU normative power 
played a crucial role in shaping the political landscape among Turkish Cypriots, not as a 
catalyst but as a framework to draw upon once the banking crisis catalysed the situation. 
Ultimately, the developments led to the opening of the border between the two sides, the 
moderate Mehmet Ali Talat taking over first as Prime Minister, then as President, and to 
the Turkish Cypriots, in contrast to the Greek Cypriots, accepting the Annan Plan for a 
resolution and the foundation of a United Cyprus Republic.  
 
There is now a widespread understanding of the EU as a normative power in Cyprus 
albeit contested surely?. However, hypothesis (5) still applies, as “Europeanisation” in 
the dominant Greek-Cypriot view is taken to mean the unrestricted implementation of the 
four freedoms (of goods, services, capital and labour) and the notion that a divided island 
would not be in the spirit of the integration project (see Demetriou forthcoming; Gürel 
and Özersay 2006: 366). The construction of the EU as a normative power therefore 
makes EU involvement problematic because one conflict party uses this construction to 
reinforce its own position. As in the acceptance of the bid for membership, this makes it 
difficult for other EU actors to argue against the Greek Cypriot position, now 
strengthened by the fact that as a member state, Cyprus can obstruct and veto policies that 
it sees as interfering with its sovereignty, and has the option of direct recourse to the 
European Court of Justice. This is problematic in itself, but also because it leads to 
disillusionment among Turkish Cypriots with the idea of the EU as a “force for good”. 
Symptomatic are the desperate attempts by the northern Cypriot Eastern Mediterranean 
University to be allowed to take part in the Bologna Process. While the Republic of 
Cyprus is vetoing such a step as recognising an “illegal entity”, the University invokes 
European norms of equality and a right to education to get access (Güven 2007).  
 
These disputes also demonstrate one further problematic aspect of the construction of the 
EU as a normative power: The norms that the EU is supposed to espouse are not 
necessarily in line with each other, and depending on the context can be seen as 
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from the norm of sticking to international law, or the Greek-Cypriot interpretation of the 
acquis. This is surely a situation of special circumstances, but it does indicate that 
normative power may be self-defeating if it contains norms that are seen as contradictory. 
 
All in all, the Cypriot picture as far as the impact of the normative power construction is 
concerned is mixed. The fact that one conflict party has used the construction to 
strengthen its position over the other party has not made it ineffective. Indeed, as we have 
shown, the notion of clear-cut conflict parties is itself misguided, and EU normative 
power played a crucial role in the transformations of the political landscape in the north. 
One cannot therefore say that there has been a reinforcement of the conflict, as 
hypothesis (5) would suggest, but while there have been many changes in conflict 
behaviour, there has also not been a transformation to the extent that one could see EU 
engagement in present circumstances as successful, and in line with hypotheses (5) and 
(3), we would only expect this to happen once there is a change in the Greek Cypriot 
position, assuming that by that time, the Turkish Cypriots have not changed their minds 
again.  
 
4.2.  The case of Israel/Palestine 
 
During 2005, the EU, together with the US, issued a series of annunciations encouraging 
the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to hold elections in the belief that the 
obstacles facing the peace process would become unblocked and that Fatah (the main 
secular-nationalist faction of the PLO) would win another endorsement from the 
Palestinian electorate to continue ruling the PA.  The EU, as well as the so-called 
international community, had a specific belief that the transformation of the conflict in 
the Middle East lay in the export of a blueprint for democracy in Palestine (a proto-state 
and an experiment in limited autonomy. Milton-Edwards, 2007; Pace, 2007b and Sadiki 
2004).  
 
Despite these statements, emphasising the importance of free, fair and transparent 
elections, the results of the January 2006 election have been considered by the EU and 
‘the international community’ as unacceptable in terms of the wider linkage to the Middle 
East Peace Process. Although the EU sent its own mission to observe these elections – 
which were declared as fair, free and transparent (although how an election process can 
be ‘fair’ under occupation may be disputed) – the organisation reacted by freezing direct 
aid to the PA, since the elected Hamas was put on the EU’s black list of outlawed 
terrorist organizations.
v During the same month, the Quartet issued a statement 
announcing a series of conditions on an internal arrangement for governance in Palestine: 
recognition of Israel, cessation of violence and acceptance of previous agreements, as 
conditions for assistance to the Palestinian people – through the PA – on the Hamas 
government. 
 
What the EU failed to acknowledge was the fact that the discourse of democracy it has 
been attempting to export to the Middle East and North Africa region, and more 
specifically to Palestine in this case, was also falling on the ears of the region’s Islamists 
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election was thus interpreted in the Middle East as a sign of the EU ignoring the 
democratic expression of the Palestinian people (even though it had made democracy one 
of the conditions for its help) and depriving many Palestinians of their livelihood. 
Therefore, although Palestinians appeared to take their first steps toward pluralism, the 
EU’s reactions to the electoral victory by Hamas stand in stark contrast to EU actors’ 
self-construction of the EU as a normative power in the region and its associated 
mediation and conflict transformation agenda for the Middle East (Pace, 2007b). With the 
rising force of modern Islamism in the southern Mediterranean neighbourhood the 
misreading of the EU’s efforts at exporting democracy to these societies has therefore 
come at a very high price, both in relation to the MEPP and the nature of how the politics 
and societies of the MENA are developing – a price the EU and the international 
community, have, so far, not been willing to pay. 
 
As a way of breaking the position adopted by the Quartet members in March 2006 (when 
they severed relations with the Hamas-dominated PA over a demand on the conditions 
set), in February 2007, Fatah and Hamas (the main protagonists in the Palestinian 
experiment of democratic governance) agreed to a new accord on power-sharing and 
political relations. The ensuing ‘Mecca Agreement’ highlighted the formation of a 
national unity government (NUG) and President Abbas insisted that the Palestinians had 
now met the conditions of the Quartet. However, the EU’s response to Mecca was once 
again – at least for most Palestinian observers – disappointing. Although the EU 
welcomed the formation of the national unity government, they announced that they 
would have no contact with Hamas ministers in the government.  
 
Since its democratic election to power, Hamas has had to deal with a number of internal 
factors of governance including their lack of capacity in ‘doing governance’.
vi Hamas 
had won the election on a platform of ‘Change and Reform’ and their determination to 
‘serve the Palestinian people’ by ensuring their rights. But they had no previous 
experience to fall back on when they found themselves in a position of power within the 
PA. Given the EU’s previous efforts at encouraging good governance in the southern 
Mediterranean neighbouring partners (not least through all its EMP as well as its ENP 
instruments) it is ironic that such a window of opportunity for the EU’s discourse of a 
‘force for good’ was not taken up through the option of training Hamas elected officials 
in governance capacity-building!  
The other party to the conflict, Israel, together with the United States, reacted with 
caution to the Mecca agreement claiming that any new government must reject terror, 
recognise Israel and honour past accords, but stopped short of making clear whether it 
was satisfied by the deal. It was however hoped that the deal brokered in Mecca would 
end weeks of factional unrest in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the EU did not 
lift the aid sanctions against the Palestinians, the issue of contact with non-Hamas 
members of the government was a departure from the Israeli and US position regarding 
the national unity government (the US and Israel decided to boycott the NUG in its 
entirety). Perhaps because of its discourse as a force for good, the EU thus emerges as 
slightly more flexible in its response in this context than either Israel (a party to the 
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it seems that their expectations from the EU’s image as a force for good was a serious 
miscalculation in that they had entered into the NUG thinking that the EU would 
eventually be more lenient and cooperate with the new government. Norway, a non-EU 
European state, was the only European country which sought engagement (rather than 
isolation) with the Hamas leader and prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh. Raymond 
Johansen, Norway’s deputy foreign minister, called on other governments to follow suit. 
Although it is an EEA member, as a non-EU member Norway’s calls for engagement by 
the international community with the NUG and all its Ministers fell on deaf ears. 
In refusing to engage the political leadership of Hamas (this could be mainly due to the 
fact that Germany, as the current holder of the rotating EU Presidency and as a key ally 
of the other party to the conflict, Israel, has the final word in what the EU actually does in 
this context), the EU refused to test the impact of its ‘force for good’ rhetoric as well as 
the simultaneous claims the Islamic movement makes to be both a negotiator for 
Palestinian rights and liberator of Palestinians (norms that the EU – albeit rhetorically – 
upholds very dearly). In such a limited vision of normative power, important forms of 
social exclusion are overlooked and the careful analysis and engagement with the 
conditions of possibility of what it means in practice to be a ‘force for good’ is placed to 
one side. 
Therefore, hypothesis (6) is applicable to the Israel/Palestine case, where although EU 
actors’ construction as a force for good is shared by at least some conflict parties, other 
aspects of the EU’s reputation make the normative power reference less effective and 
which in turn has a negative effect on possibilities for conflict transformation due to the 
contradictions in the EU’s rhetoric as a force for good on the one hand and its actual 
praxis on the other. 
 
 
5.  Condition or Contradiction? A Critical Assessment 
 
The EU is not only discussed as, it also sees its self as a normative power, a “force for 
good”, in international politics. If accepted by other actors, we argued in this paper, this 
should put it in a good position to intervene in conflicts to transform them so that violent 
action no longer dominates or is prevented in the future, and that conflict issues are dealt 
with not in terms of security but under “normal” democratic procedures. However, the 
two cases that we drew upon to illustrate our argument paint a different picture. In both 
of them, the conflict has not taken a clearly positive turn even though the EU is involved, 
albeit to various degrees. It seems then that EU normative power in conflict situations, at 
least as long as they are not formally and unambiguously part of the integration process, 
remains largely an unrealised potential. In our two cases, this has as much to do with the 
EU itself and how it interacts with the conflict parties, often in contrast to its self-
construction as a “force for good”, as it has with the way the conflict parties see the EU.  
 
To the extent that there have been transformations in these two conflicts, and that one can 
arguably link them to EU involvement, the impact has been ambiguous rather than 
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case in particular, the normative power of the EU was effective after the banking crisis 
that led to a change in political leadership and the acceptance of the Annan Plan. 
However, this normative power is fading to the extent that northern Cyprus is hardly 
closer to the EU than it was before the accession of the Republic of Cyprus and the 
Annan Plan referenda. Indeed, as we have seen, EU normative power has also enabled 
forces on the Greek-Cypriot side to strengthen their claims and to articulate the conflict 
with further securitising moves. 
 
We therefore found that in our cases, our initial propositions (5) and (6) prevailed: While 
some, and at times all of the conflict parties accepted the construction of the EU as a 
normative power, they either did so to strengthen their own position, or, as in the case of 
Israel-Palestine, they also held other views of the EU that counter-acted and overrode any 
potential positive impact flowing from the normative power construct. Of course, our 
cases had an initial illustrative purpose and cannot count as a systematic evaluation of our 
argument, but we suggest that similar findings will emerge from other studies: EU 
normative power is not simply able to shape conceptions of what is seen as normal; its 
effectiveness rather relies on the extent to which other actors accept the role that EU 
actors themselves project for themselves into international politics. 
 
The failure to act consistently in the Israel/Palestine case in particular also reinforces our 
previous argument that much of the normative power discourse is not about an 
“objective” analysis of EU behaviour but rather about the construction of an EU identity. 
While Manners (2006a: 168, 2006b) sees this as a positive political move of the original 
normative power argument, we would like to point to the dangers that this involves. Such 
an identity construction blinds actors from their own failings and deficiencies both in 
internal affairs as well as in their engagement with others. To the extent that it enables 
practices that undermine the construction itself, the notion of an identity of the EU as a 
normative power not only has problematic consequences, but may also be self-defeating. 
 
All of this does not deny the potential that there is in the normative power discourse for a 
positive role that the EU can play in conflict transformation. The current evidence, 
however, provides a much more ambiguous and patchy picture. As with other aspects of 
normative power Europe, such power will only be a positive force to the extent that 
others accept it, and if it is, not merely about telling others how great the EU is.  
 
References 
 
 
Attiná, Fulvio (2001) ‘Conclusions: Partnership Building’ in F. Attiná and S. Stavridis 
(eds.), The Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Issues from Stuttgart to 
Marseille. (Milan: Dott. A Giuffrè Editore). 
Buzan, Barry; Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). 
Chehab, Zaki (2007) Inside Hamas. The Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies 
(London and New York: I.B. Tauris). 
  13Coppetiers, Bruno et al. (2004) Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies 
from the European Periphery (Gent: Academia Press). 
Demetriou, Olga (forthcoming) ‘Catalysis, catachresis: the EU’s impact on the Cyprus 
conflict’ in Diez et al. (forthcoming). 
Diez, Thomas (2002a) ‘Last exit to paradise? The European Union, the Cyprus conflict 
and the problematic “catalytic effect”’, in Thomas Diez (ed), The European Union and 
the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press), 139-62. 
Diez, Thomas (2002b) ‘Why the EU can nonetheless be good for Cyprus’, Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 2 (2), 
http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/Focus2-2002_Diez.pdf. 
Diez, Thomas (2005) ‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering 
“normative power Europe”’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33 (3), 613-36. 
Diez, Thomas and Jef Huysmans (2007) ‘Securitizations and desecuritizations: the 
politics of exception and the politics of unease’, manuscript under review. 
Diez, Thomas and Ian Manners (2007) ‘Reflecting on normative power Europe’, in Felix 
Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams (eds) Power in World Politics (London: 
Routledge), forthcoming. 
Diez, Thomas; Stephan Stetter and Mathias Albert (2006) ‘The European Union and 
border conflicts: the transformative power of integration’ International Organization 60 
(3), 563-93. 
Diez, Thomas; Mathias Albert and Stephan Stetter (eds) (forthcoming) The European 
Union and Border Conflicts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
European Parliament (2005) Report on the European Neighbourhood Policy. Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Rapporteur Charles Tannock, Document A6-0399/2005, 7 December. 
Fierke, Karin M. and Antje Wiener (2001) ‘Constructing institutional interests: EU and 
NATO enlargement’, in Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Antje Wiener 
(eds) The Social Construction of Europe (London: Sage), 121-39. 
Foucault, Michel (1981) ‘The Order of Discourse’, trans. Ian McLeod, in R. Young (Ed.) 
Untying the Text. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
Gürel, Ayla and Kudret Özersay (2006) ‘Cyprus and the politics of property’ 
Mediterranean Politics 11 (3), 349-69. 
Güven, Halil (2007) Update on efforts to end educational isolations imposed on North 
Cyprus Universities, e-mail correspondence, 6 March 2007. 
Higashino, Atsuko (2004) ‘For the sake of ‘peace and security’? The role of security in 
the European Union enlargement eastwards’ Cooperation and Conflict 39 (4), 347-68. 
Hroub, Khaled (2006) Hamas. A Beginner’s Guide (London: Pluto Press). 
Lacher, Hannes and Erol Kaymak (2005) ‘Transforming identities: beyond the politics of 
non-settlement in north Cyprus’ Mediterranean Politics 10 (2), 147-66. 
Levitt, Matthew (2006) Hamas. Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press). 
Manners, Ian (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’ Journal of 
Common Market Studies 40 (2), 235-58. 
Manners, Ian (2006a) ‘The European Union as a normative power: a response to Thomas 
Diez’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35 (1), 167-180. 
  14Manners, Ian (2006b) ‘What is normative about the normative power of the European 
Union in world politics?’, Paper presented at the 47
th ISA convention, San Diego, 22 
March 2006. 
Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2007) ‘Hamas, government and the challenge for democratic 
reform’. Paper presented at a workshop on Europe’s Legacy? From colonialism to 
democracy promotion: the case of the Mediterranean. Centre for Contemporary Middle 
East Studies, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark, 21-22 Apr. 
Pace, Michelle (2006) The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the 
Mediterranean (London: Routledge).  
Pace, Michelle (2007a) ‘The Construction of EU Normative Power’ Journal of Common 
Market Studies (September issue, forthcoming). 
Pace, Michelle (2007b) ‘Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU democracy promotion in 
the Mediterranean: the limits of EU normative power’. Paper presented at a workshop on 
Europe’s Legacy? From colonialism to democracy promotion: the case of the 
Mediterranean. Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of Southern 
Denmark, Odense, Denmark, 21-22 Apr. 
Pace, Michelle (forthcoming) ‘The EU as a “force for good” in border conflict cases?’ in 
Diez et al. (eds) (forthcoming). 
Richmond, Oliver (2002) ‘The multiple dimensions of international peacemaking: UN 
and EU involvement in the Cyprus conflict’, Thomas Diez (ed), The European Union and 
the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press), 117-36. 
Sadiki, Larbi (2004) The Search For Arab Democracy. Discourse and Counter-
Discourses (London: Hurst & Company). 
Schimmelfenning, Frank (2001) ‘The community trap: liberal norms, rhetorical action 
and the eastern enlargement of the European Union’ International Organization 55 (1), 
47-80. 
Siniver, Asaf (2006) ‘Power, impartiality and timing: three hypotheses on third party 
mediation in the Middle East’ Political Studies 54 (4), 806-26. 
Smith, James D. (2004) ‘Mediator impartiality: banishing the Chimera’ Journal of Peace 
Research 31 (4), 445-50. 
Tamimi, Azzam (2007) Hamas. Unwritten Chapters (London: Hurst & Company).  
Tocci, Nathalie (2005) EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing 
Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus? (London: Ashgate). 
Wæver, Ole (1995) ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) 
On Security (New York: Columbia University Press), 46-86. 
Zartman, I. William (1989) Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa; 
updated edition (New York: Oxford University Press).   
  
                                                 
i   This section draws upon Pace in Diez et al, forthcoming. 
ii  Interview, Council of the European Union (Brussels, 20 January 2004).  
iii Interview, Council of the European Union (Brussels, February 2005). 
iv  Interview, European Commission (Brussels, 21 January 2004). 
  15                                                                                                                                                 
v Hamas had also received much international condemnation for using suicide attacks to 
pursue its resistance strategy. In the eyes of the EU, Hamas challenges the notion of a 
democratic political party. 
vi Hamas’s decision to take part in the 2006 elections had a profound impact on the nature 
of the movement as well as on the Palestinian political scene and on the peace process at 
large. At the level of its internal composition, participation in the election was perceived 
as a step towards politicizing the movement – at the expense of its well-known 
militarism. See Chehab 2007; Hroub 2006; Levitt 2006 and Tamimi 2007 for more on 
this. 
  16